protects the states' prerogative to legalize activity that Congress bans. The federal government has banned marijuana outright, and for years federal officials have lobbied against local efforts to legalize medical use of the drug. However, an ever-growing number of states have adopted legalization measures. I explain why these state laws, and most related regulations, have not been-and cannot be-preempted by Congress. I also develop a new framework for analyzing the boundary between the proper exercise of federal supremacy and prohibited commandeering.
Although I focus on medical marijuana, the legal analysis applies to any issue pitting permissive state laws against restrictive federal regulations. Recent referenda in Colorado and Washington that legalize the recreational use of marijuana for adults will likely prompt federal officials to respond by touting the supremacy of the federal ban and challenging the constitutionality of state efforts at legalization. Such state reforms should carry the day in the event of such a legal challenge.
Introduction
It is taken for granted in federalism discourse that if Congress has the authority to regulate an activity, its laws reign supreme and trump conflicting state regulations on the same subject. When Congress legalizes a private activity that has been banned by the states, the application of the Supremacy Clause is relatively straightforward: barring contrary congressional intent, such state laws are unenforceable and, hence, largely immaterial in the sense they do not affect private decisions regarding whether to engage in the activity. 1 When Congress bans some activity that has been legalized by the states, however, both the legal status and practical import of state law are far less obvious. 2 Contrary to conventional wisdom, state laws legalizing conduct banned by Congress remain in force and, in many instances, may even constitute the de facto governing law of the land. The survival and success of these state laws are the result of previously overlooked constraints on Congress's preemption authority under the Supremacy Clause as well as practical constraints on its enforcement power. Using medical marijuana as a case study, this paper will examine the states' underappreciated power to legalize activity that Congress bans.
Congress has banned marijuana outright, recognizing no permissible medical use for the drug. Violation of the ban carries a variety of modest to severe sanctions, both criminal and civil. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress's power to enact the ban. 3 In fact, the Court suggested that Congress's power to regulate, and hence to proscribe, medical marijuana (among other things) was almost unlimited. 4 The decision caused some commentators to declare that the war over medical marijuana was over, and that the states had clearly lost. 5 As long as Congress wanted to eradicate marijuana, the states seemingly could do nothing to stop it.
But Raich did not stop (or even slow) state legalization campaigns. At the time Raich was decided, when Congress's authority was still (somewhat) doubtful, 10 states had legalized medical marijuana. 6 Since that time, however, 8 more states (and the District of Columbia) have passed legislation legalizing the use of medical marijuana, 7 and several more states may soon join the fray. 8 The flurry of legislative activity is puzzling: If the war on medical marijuana is truly over, why are the states still fighting?
The states retain both de jure and de facto power to exempt medical marijuana from criminal sanctions, in spite of Congress's uncompromising ban on the drug. States may continue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not preempted-and more importantly, may not preempt-state laws that merely permit (i.e., refuse to punish) private conduct the federal government deems objectionable. To be sure, the objectives of the state and federal governments clearly conflict: states want some residents to be able to use marijuana, while Congress wants total abstention. But to say that Congress may thereby preempt state inaction (which is what legalization amounts to, after all) would, in effect, permit Congress to command the states to take some actionnamely, to proscribe medical marijuana. The Court's anti-commandeering rule, however, clearly prohibits Congress from doing this. 9 In this paper I will develop a new framework for analyzing the boundary between permissible preemption and prohibited commandeering-the state-of-nature benchmark. The state-of-nature benchmark eliminates much of the confusion that has clouded disputes over state medical marijuana laws. It suggests that as long as states go no further-and do not actively assist marijuana users, growers, and so on-they may continue to look the other way when their citizens defy federal law.
On a more practical level, the fact that state exemptions remain enforceable is consequential; these states laws, in other words, are not merely symbolic gestures. The main reason is that the federal government lacks the resources needed to enforce its own ban More battles will be fought, but they won't change the reality that the states-and not the federal governmenthave already won the war over medical marijuana.
vigorously: although it commands a $2 trillion dollar (plus) budget, the federal government is only a two-bit player when it comes to marijuana enforcement. Only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities. 10 The states, by virtueof their greater law enforcement resources (among other things), hold the upper hand. The federal ban may be strict-and its penalties severebut without the wholehearted cooperation of state law enforcement authorities, its impact on private behavior will remain limited. Most medical marijuana users and suppliers can feel confident they will never be caught by the federal government.
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Even more interesting, an analysis of the medical marijuana conflict reveals that states also have comparatively strong sway over the private (non-legal) forces that shape our actions, such as our personal beliefs about behavior and our social norms. Simply by allowing their residents to use marijuana for medical purposes, the states have arguably fostered more tolerant attitudes toward the practice, making it seem more compassionate, less dangerous, and less wicked, thereby removing or softening the personal and societal reproach that once suppressed medical use of the drug. The expressive power of permissive state legislation-largely ignored by the academy-cannot easily be undone or countered by Congress. As a result, the states may possess even more de facto power vis-à-vis Congress than is commonly perceived.
In this paper I will provide a definitive study of one of the most important federalism disputes in a generation. 12 It shows that states have wielded far more power and influence over medical marijuana than previously recognized. The states have not only kept the patient breathing, so to speak, in anticipation of a day when federal policy might change; they have, for all practical purposes, already made medical marijuana de facto legal within their jurisdictions.To be sure, more battles will be fought, but they won't change the reality that the states-and not the federal government-have already won the war over medical marijuana.
More important, however, by shedding new light on the struggle over medical marijuana, this paper also has much broader relevance to our understandings of federalism and state resistance to federal authority. Although it focuses on medical marijuana, the insights generated here could be applied across a wide range of issues pitting restrictive federal legislation against more permissive state laws. Over the past decade, states have legalized a variety of controversial practices that Congress has sought to proscribe or restrict. For example, states now recognize same-sex marriages, legalize certain abortion procedures, permit sports gambling, and allow possession of firearms that Congress proscribes (or has sought to curtail). 13 Referenda in Colorado and Washington now allow even more federally proscribed activity, namely, the recreational use of marijuana.
14 As the case study of medical marijuana demonstrates, states (generally) possess legal authority to enact permissive legislation governing such issues, in spite of contrary congressional policy: states are merely restoring the state of nature. And as with medical marijuana, the ultimate outcome on such issues may hinge more on Congress's capacity to enforce its own laws and its ability to manage the non-legal forces that shape our behavior than on the Supreme Court's proclamations demarcating Congress's substantive powers vis-à-vis the states. I highlight the need for courts, commentators, and lawmakers to distinguish between federal laws authorizing conduct banned by the states (under which state power is significantly constrained), and federal laws banning conduct authorized by the states (under which states wield considerably more power).
Marijuana Laws
In order to lay the necessary foundation for the legal analysis, I will begin with a discussion of state and federal marijuana Since then, 17 more states and the District of Columbia have passed legislation permitting residents to possess, use, cultivate, and (sometimes) distribute marijuana for medical purposes, and several more states seem poised to follow suit. And, as noted above, voters in Colorado and Washington have recently gone further by approving referenda to legalize the recreational use of marijuana. Those new laws impose far fewer restrictions on who may possess and use marijuana pursuant to state law.
The medical exemptions vary, but all of these states apply a common framework for determining who qualifies for them. To begin with, they specify that a prospective medical marijuana user must have a debilitating medical condition that has been diagnosed by a physician in the course of a bona fide medical exam. The list of qualifying conditions typically includes cancer, glaucoma, AIDS (or HIV), and other chronic diseases that produce symptoms such as severe pain, nausea, seizures, or persistent muscle spasms. 17 In addition to being diagnosed with a qualifying condition, all states require a prospective user to obtain his or her physician's recommendation to use marijuana. A recommendation is not a prescription (for reasons explained below, this seemingly trivial distinction does matter). To recommend marijuana, the physician need only conclude, after considering other treatment options, that marijuana "may benefit" the patient; as it sounds, this standard appears fairly easy to satisfy.
18
Most states also require prospective users to register with the state before using, handling, or cultivating marijuana for medical purposes. 19 A person who fails to register ex ante is usually barred from claiming the medical marijuana exemption in a subsequent criminal investigation, even if he or she could satisfy all of the other requirements of the exemption. 20 The remaining states impose few formal requirements on prospective users beyond obtaining the physician diagnosis and recommendation. 21 To register, prospective users must always provide a signed form from their physician. This form must attest that the physician has examined the patient, diagnosed the patient with a qualifying medical condition, and determined that marijuana might benefit the patient's condition. 22 The patient must also provide contact information for him or herself, the physician, and the designated caregiver. 23 Once the registration application has been reviewed and the patient's eligibility confirmed, the state will issue a registry identification card for the patient and the patient's designated caregiver. 24 The card looks similar to a driver's license: it displays the patient's photo, name, address, and registration number, along with the names of the patient's physician and caregiver. The registration must be renewed periodically-every year, in most states-for a patient to maintain eligibility for the state's exemptions. All states us-5 California's system allows qualified patients and their caregivers to grow marijuana collectively in so-called cannabis cooperatives.
ing a registration system also require patients to report any changes that might alter their eligibility, such as a change in their medical condition.
States impose some restrictions on residents who satisfy these criteria. For example, states limit how much marijuana each qualified patient may lawfully possess at any given time. The limits vary, but are usually between 1 and 3 ounces of "usable" marijuana and between 6 and 12 marijuana plants. 25 A few states allow physicians to set the amount based on the patient's needs. 26 States also bar qualified patients from using or possessing marijuana in certain contexts, such as on public property or while driving. 27 Medical marijuana laws provide significant legal protection for qualified patients. Qualified patients are usually exempt from arrest and prosecution for possessing, cultivating, or using marijuana. 28 They are also exempt from every other civil sanction (e.g., forfeiture) that normally applies under state drug laws. 29 For that reason, one can claim that states have legalized marijuana, and not merely decriminalized it. Many states go one step further and give qualified patients the right to recover any marijuana that has been seized by state law enforcement agents in the course of an investigation.
30 And a few even bar landlords, employers, and schools from discriminating against qualified medical marijuana patients based on their status as such.
31
Caregivers and physicians are also afforded some legal protections under state laws. Most states allow designated caregivers to legally possess, handle, and even cultivate marijuana on behalf of qualified patients without fear of state-imposed sanctions.
32
No state permits physicians to handle or dispense marijuana, but states do shield physicians from being sanctioned by government or private entities (e.g., employers and licensing boards) for recommending marijuana to their patients. 33 Although states have adopted fairly detailed regulations specifying who may possess and use marijuana, they have been more circumspect regarding how qualified patients are actually supposed to acquire marijuana, in the first instance, and more reticent to shield marijuana suppliers from state sanctions. In some states, there is simply no legal way for qualified patients to obtain usable marijuana or even the plants or seeds needed to grow their own supply. Indeed, some states have explicitly banned the sale of marijuana to qualified patients, even though such patients may clearly possess, use, and cultivate the drug themselves. 34 This means that qualified patients must often resort to the black market to obtain the marijuana they are legally entitled to possess, cultivate, and use.
Most states that have directly addressed the supply issue require prospective vendors to obtain a license from the state or a local government. 35 These states generally limit the number of licenses they will issue. 36 The license exempts holders from state criminal sanctions that normally apply to the distribution of marijuana, as long as they abide by regulations that limit their operations. 37 Colorado, for example, has imposed a wide range of restrictions on licensed marijuana dispensaries-inter alia, they must install advanced security systems and check customer documentation at every sale. 38 Colorado and Washington have proposed similar licensing regimes to govern the recreational marijuana market. California's system for regulating the supply of medical marijuana is unique. It allows qualified patients and their caregivers to grow marijuana collectively in so-called cannabis cooperatives.
39
These dispensaries may not sell to nonmembers. The state doesn't license dispensaries, but many local governments have sought to do so. 40 The state's attorney general has also issued some nonbinding guidelines for how cooperatives should operate.
41
At least six states have seriously considered supplying marijuana directly to qualified patients through state-run distribution centers. 42 The marijuana would be grown on state-run farms or diverted from drug seizures made by state police. Despite the obvious appeal of maintaining close state control 6
The federal government has steadfastly refused to expand legal access to marijuana.
over the medical marijuana supply chain, no state has yet directly participated in the manufacture or distribution of marijuana-and for good reason. As discussed below, such state distribution programs are clearly preempted by federal law, and if they were ever executed, they would expose state agents to federal criminal liability.
Current Federal Law
Substance of the Controlled Substances Act. Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in 1970. The statute regulates the manufacture, possession, and distribution of drugs, including marijuana. 43 Under the CSA, drugs are classified into one of five schedules (I-V) depending on their medicinal value, potential for abuse, and psychological and physical effects on the body. 44 Congress placed marijuana on Schedule I, the most severely restricted category, based on a determination that marijuana had no accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse. 45 The manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana, like other Schedule I drugs, is thus forbidden at the federal level, though a few minor exceptions have been made and will be discussed below. 46 Drugs on Schedules II-V are progressively less tightly controlled; for example, they may be legally prescribed for medical treatment. 47 Only two limited exceptions to the federal ban on marijuana have been made. The first, a compassionate-use program created under former president Carter, is superficially analogous to extant state medical-use programs; it allows patients to use marijuana legally for therapeutic purposes. The marijuana for the program is supplied by a federally approved grow-site at the University of Mississippi (the only federally approved grow-site in the United States). However, the program stopped accepting new applications in 1992, and fewer than eight (yes, eight) patients currently receive marijuana through it. Over its entire history, only 36 patients have been enrolled. 48 The second, and only other way to obtain marijuana legally under federal law, is by participating in a Federal Drug Administration-approved research study. But since the federal government approves so few marijuana research projects-11 between 2000-2009-only a small fraction of the population that currently qualifies for state exemptions could participate. 49 The federal government has steadfastly refused to expand legal access to marijuana. Congress has rejected proposals to reschedule the drug or to suspend enforcement of the CSA against people who may use marijuana under state law. 50 Likewise, the federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has denied petitions to reschedule the drug administratively.
51
One may ask why the federal government has made such a fuss over a drug that so many consider harmless, particularly when used by the seriously ill. This hard-line stance against medical marijuana stems from several firmly rooted beliefs: that marijuana's medical benefits are, at best, unproven; that it harms users and third parties; that legalizing marijuana for medical purposes suggests the drug is safe for other uses as well; and that marijuana grown for medical purposes would invariably be diverted onto the black market.
52 Though the Obama administration once hinted it might adopt a softer approach toward the medical use of marijuana, it has recently adopted the hard-line stance taken by its predecessors. 53 In sum, it appears the categorical federal ban on marijuana is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Anyone who possesses, cultivates, or distributes marijuana pursuant to state law commits a federal crime and is subject to federal sanctions.
Grading and punishment of marijuana offenses under the CSA depend on the nature of the offense (i.e., possession versus manufacturing and distributing), the quantity of marijuana involved, and the offender's criminal history. Most marijuana users would be criminally prosecuted, if at all, for simple possession under the CSA, though they could also be considered manufacturers if they grow their own marijuana. Simple possession of marijuana constitutes 7 DEA agents raided Diane Monson's California home and seized her six marijuana plants.
a misdemeanor under federal law, punishable by up to one year imprisonment and a minimum $1,000 fine, plus court costs. 54 Offenders with prior drug records, however, face tougher sanctions: one prior conviction triggers mandatory prison time of 15 days, raises the minimum fine to $2,500, and extends the maximum prison term to 2 years; a second conviction triggers a minimum term of 90 days imprisonment, a minimum fine of $5,000 plus costs, and a maximum prison term of 3 years. 55 What is more, even minor drug convictions can trigger harsh collateral sanctions under both state and federal law, including loss of student financial aid and public assistance.
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Those who cultivate or distribute marijuana face even more severe consequences under the CSA. The manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute any amount of marijuana constitutes a felony, carrying a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $1 million for entities. 57 The maximum sanctions are doubled if the defendant has a prior felony drug conviction. 58 As quantities increase, so do the sanctions. Cases involving more than 50 kilograms of marijuana or more than 50 plants carry a maximum term of 20 years (absent aggravating factors) and a maximum fine of $5 million. 59 Cases involving more than 100 kilograms or more than 100 plants carry a mandatory sentence of 5 years imprisonment (the maximum is life) and a maximum fine of $10 million. 60 Lastly, cases involving massive quantities (i.e., more than 1,000 kilograms or 1,000 plants) carry a mandatory sentence of 10 years imprisonment (the maximum is life) and a maximum fine of $20 million.
61
Constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act. The federal government categorically bans marijuana. Federal authorities have resisted efforts to reschedule marijuana ever since the CSA was enacted, and the federal policy on medical marijuana seems unlikely to change dramatically anytime soon. Opponents of the federal ban have thus sought to circumscribe Congress's constitutional authority over the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana, with hopes of preserving nascent state laws that accord medical marijuana far more favorable treatment.
Gonzales v. Raich seemingly presented opponents of the federal ban their best shot at limiting congressional control over marijuana. 62 Raich involved a challenge to Congress's power to regulate the noncommercial, purely intrastate production and consumption of marijuana for medical purposes-an application of the CSA that everyone would agree is at the outermost bounds of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
The case arose after DEA agents raided Diane Monson's California home and seized her six marijuana plants. Monson and fellow Californian Angel Raich sought a preliminary injunction in order to block the DEA from enforcing the CSA's ban against them. Both women had been using marijuana legally under California law pursuant to the recommendations of their respective physicians to treat medical conditions that were not responding to more conventional therapies. Monson grew her own marijuana, while Raich got hers from two caregivers. They claimed (and the Court assumed) the marijuana they used was grown locally, using only local inputs, and was provided to them free of charge. In a 6-3 decision, however, the Raich Court flatly rejected the challenge. The Court found that the noncommercial, intrastate activities Raich and Monson sought to exempt from congressional control were hopelessly entwined with the interstate drug trade-in essence, Congress's dominion over the latter (which no one seriously questioned) necessarily required control of the former as well. 64 According to the majority, "One need not have a degree in economics to Specifically, the Court reasoned that because of "high demand" for the drug, some marijuana grown locally for personal use would be diverted onto the interstate drug market, frustrating congressional efforts to eradicate that market. 66 Thus, in order to preserve Congress's legitimate interest in eradicating the larger interstate drug trade, the Court upheld application of the CSA to the noncommercial, intrastate production and consumption of marijuana. In short, the Court quashed whatever doubts may have once existed about the constitutionally permissible reach of the CSA.
Something's Gotta Give
Not surprisingly, post-Raich assessments of the states' authority over medical marijuana have been mostly grim. Justice O'Connor captured the prevailing sentiment in her Raich dissent. Condemning the Court's refusal to grant the states any reprieve from the federal ban, she gave a bleak appraisal of state power: "California . . . has come to its own conclusion about the difficult and sensitive question of whether marijuana should be available to relieve severe pain and suffering. Today the Court sanctions an application of the federal Controlled Substances Act that extinguishes that experiment."
67
These grim assessments stem from serious doubts about the legal status and practical significance of laws exempting marijuana from state sanctions. Consider, first, questions surrounding the states' de jure power to enact and enforce such laws. Many scholars have suggested (or simply assumed) that state medical marijuana laws have been preempted by the CSA. 68 Though no one has considered the assertion at length, it seems to be based upon a straightforward application of conflict preemption doctrine as presently understood. 69 Caleb Nelson, one of the nation's leading scholars of preemption, explains the doctrine as follows:
If state law purports to authorize something that federal law forbids or to penalize something that federal law gives people an unqualified right to do, then courts would have to choose between applying the federal rule and applying the state rule, and the Supremacy Clause requires them to apply the federal rule.
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Nelson did not have medical marijuana laws in mind when he wrote this formula, but the implication of the highlighted passage seems abundantly clear: a state law that allows citizens to use marijuana must give way to a federal law that bans the use of marijuana.
71
The preemption concerns must be taken seriously, given the obvious tension between state and federal marijuana policy and the consequences wrought by preemption. If preempted, state medical marijuana laws would be null and void. They would remain on the books, but they would be unenforce- 81 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the preemption issue, despite many claims to the contrary, and some states have carried on despite lingering doubts about their de jure authority (though not without struggles, as just noted). 82 The problem is that the analysis on both sides of the preemption debate has been largely conclusory or misguided, leaving lawmakers frustrated and confused as they deliberate how to proceed.
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Consider next the practical significance of state laws removing state sanctions for marijuana. Do such laws actually affect private behavior, given that citizens continue to face steep federal sanctions for possessing, cultivating, or distributing marijuana? Generally speaking, assessments of the states' de facto power-their ability to change private behavior-have been more upbeat and more thoughtful than assessments of the states' de jure power. The basic thrust of the conventional wisdom is that the federal government does not have the capacity to enforce the CSA against marijuana users.
84 As a practical matter, most people can smoke marijuana for any purpose without having to worry much about being caught and punished by the federal government.
Nonetheless, questions about the practical import of state laws persist. Although the federal government has not criminally prosecuted many medical marijuana users in
The preemption
power is constrained by the anticommandeering principle.
the past decade, it has aggressively targeted suppliers (e.g., the DEA has raided nearly 160 medical marijuana dispensaries since 2009), 85 their landlords, 86 and physicians who recommend the drug to patients 87 in order to disrupt essential components of state marijuana programs.
More interesting, some have suggested that the federal ban blocks states from fostering independent, marijuana-friendly norms in their jurisdictions. As long as the federal ban persists, so the argument goes, social norms condemning drug use and criminal behavior will continue to suppress use of marijuana for medical purposes, even if the federal ban is not rigorously enforced. 88 As one prominent criminal law scholar reasoned, "If a seriously ill patient in California is denied legal medicinal marijuana by contrary federal law, he will simply suffer rather than attempt to obtain marijuana through the illegal drug market." 89 In sum, depending on which source one consults, one might conclude that state medical marijuana programs are preempted, and thus unenforceable; enforceable but impotent; or, more rarely, unencumbered by federal law. None of the extant accounts is satisfactory; analysis of state authority has been wanting, inconsistent, and unconvincing. As a result, confusion has and very well could continue to reign on medical marijuana and on other issues. Indeed, in many respects, despite important changes to state laws and developments in federal constitutional law, our understanding of states' power to legalize conduct Congress forbids has not evolved much since the 1970s and 1980s. Given the stakes involved in this dispute, and the striking parallels across many other important and timely social issues, the time has come for closer scrutiny.
De Jure State Power

Congress's Preemptive Power
Congress's preemption power is expansive. It is a basic legal principle that Congress may preempt any state law that obstructs, contradicts, impedes, or conflicts with federal law. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that when Congress possesses the constitutional authority to regulate an activity, it may preempt any state law governing that same activity. 90 That view is incorrect. Congress's preemption power is not coextensive with its substantive powers, such as its authority to regulate interstate commerce. The preemption power is constrained by the anti-commandeering principle. That rule stipulates that Congress may not command state legislatures to enact laws nor order state officials to administer them. 91 To be sure, the rule does not limit Congress's substantive powers but rather only the means by which Congress may pursue them. For example, Congress may designate the sites for new radioactive waste dumps, although it may not order state legislatures to do so; and it may require background checks for gun purchases, although it may not order state law enforcement officials to conduct them. All the same, the anti-commandeering rule constrains Congress's power to preempt state law in at least one increasingly important circumstance-namely, when state law simply permits private conduct to occurbecause preemption of such a law would be tantamount to commandeering.
To see why, it is necessary to examine carefully the boundary between commandeering and preemption. Legal scholars suggest that boundary depends on a crucial distinction between action and inaction. Commandeering compels state action, whereas preemption, by contrast, compels inaction. 92 to have proposed such a definition for use in this circumstance. Employing a definition widely used in philosophy, Adler and Kreimer suggest positive action connotes physical movement, and inaction connotes immobility. 94 As it sounds, this definition of action is very broad: it encompasses literally any physical movement by state officials-for example, when state legislators "open their mouths or raise their hands to vote 'yea'" on legislation; or when state law enforcement agents "raise their pens, or touch their fingers to computer keyboards, so as to issue arrest warrants, subpoenas, indictments, and so on." 95 The trouble with this broad definition of action is that it generates arbitrary results in an important subset of cases-namely, anytime a state must take one action (e.g., repeal a law) in order to stop taking another (e.g., impose sanctions under that law). To illustrate, suppose California currently has a law on the books imposing a minimum one-year prison term for simple possession of marijuana. Clearly, the imposition of the sanction entails positive action by the state: state agents must investigate, arrest, charge, prosecute, convict, and imprison offendersall, presumably, positive actions. Congress could not, of course, compel California to enact this law. But suppose California is now considering repealing the law. If positive action entails any physical movement by state officials, then repealing an old law is indistinguishable from passing a new one; after all, both require positive action by state officials. Legislators must say "aye" to pass the measure, the Governor must sign the bill, and so on. 96 It follows that if Congress can block any positive action, it could seemingly bar California from repealing its law even though it could not compel California to adopt the law in the first instance. The result is arbitrary, and I doubt anyone, including Adler and Kreimer, thinks it accurately predicts how the Court would actually rule. 97 Unfortunately, however, nothing in the unadorned action/inaction framework and expansive definition of action enables a court to avoid the result.
If not all positive actions by the states are preemptable, we must figure out how to distinguish the actions that are preemptable from the ones that are not. A sensible approach to that is to ask whether the state action in question constitutes a departure from, or a return to, the proverbial state of nature. 98 In the state of nature, many forces shape human behavior: endowments, preferences, norms, and so on. Critically, however, government has no distinct influence on behavior. Government departs from the state of nature when it engages in some action, broadly defined, that makes a given behavior occur more or less frequently than it would if we were to consider only the private and social forces shaping that behavior. For example, imposing a fine of $100 (or awarding a subsidy of $100) for doing X would decrease (or increase) the incidence of X as compared to the state of nature. It is the state of nature-and not action/ inaction, per se-that defines the boundary between permissible preemption and impermissible commandeering. Namely, Congress may drive states into-or prevent states from departing from-this state of nature (preemption), but Congress may not drive them out of-or prevent them from returning tothe state of nature (commandeering).
Using the state-of-nature benchmark to shield some state action from congressional preemption closes an arbitrary loophole in the action/inaction framework while also closely adhering to long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence. First, by examining the consequences of positive action and not just its presence or absence, the state-of-nature benchmark avoids the arbitrary result illustrated above. Congress could not stop California from repealing its sanctioning law under the benchmark, even though repeal of that law clearly entails some positive action, for the repeal merely restores the state of nature in California-no direct state government influence on possession of marijuana. Second, the state-of-nature benchmark tracks an important and often overlooked feature of the Court's preemption jurisprudence: namely, the Court has never held that Congress could Time and again, legal authorities have failed to distinguish between state laws that punish behavior and those that merely tolerate it.
block states from merely allowing some private behavior to occur, even if that behavior is forbidden by Congress. 99 To be sure, the Court has found myriad state laws preempted, but only when the states have punished or subsidized (broadly defined) behavior Congress sought to foster or deter-that is, only when states departed from the state of nature. 100 Even field preemption, the ultimate exercise of preemption power, only restores states to the state of nature; it does not require them to depart from it.
Time and again, legal authorities have failed to distinguish between state laws that punish (or subsidize) behavior and those that merely tolerate it. This oversight has generated confusion and mistaken conclusions about state medical marijuana laws and other state legislation. I propose a stateof-nature benchmark as an interpretive guide that more accurately and completely captures the distinction between commandeering and preemption than does the unadorned action/inaction framework.
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It should be noted that there is one important exception to the benchmark and the alternative action/inaction framework. In particular, Congress may require states to depart from the state of nature and to take positive action if it imposes a similar duty on private citizens-that is, as long as that duty is generally applicable.
102 Thus, for example, Congress may require states to seek the consent of citizens before selling their private information to third parties. 103 The measure compels a departure from the state of nature (and positive action), but because it applies generally and not just to the states, it is permissible under the Supreme Court's doctrine. It is worth noting, however, that the Court has recently imposed some limits on Congress's power to impose positive duties on ordinary citizens, thereby potentially limiting the significance of this exception to the anti-commandeering rule.
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Congress's Preemptive Intent
The anti-commandeering rule, properly understood, imposes an important and largely overlooked constraint on Congress's preemption power. Congress may neither dislodge states from nor keep states out of the state of nature. The state of nature thus demarcates the outer bounds of what Congress may do. Congress, of course, can always choose to do even less; thus, when it so desires, Congress can decline to preempt state laws that depart from the state of nature.
105
The CSA is a case in point. The CSA preempts some, but not all, state medical marijuana laws that Congress could, in theory, preempt; for instance, all of the state laws that make proscribed drug use more common than it would be if we considered only the private and social forces that shaped drug behavior. Congress expressly addressed the preemption issue in section 903 of the CSA:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.
106
Broadly speaking, section 903 preempts any state law that positively conflicts with a provision of the CSA on the same subject matter so that the two cannot consistently stand together. That phrase hardly begets an easy interpretation. However, mindful of the constitutional principles discussed above, a positive conflict would seem to arise anytime a state engages in, or requires others to engage in, conduct or inaction that violates the CSA. 107 In the same way that a state law requiring X cannot be reconciled with a federal law banning X, state laws that require the possession, use, distribution, or manufac-
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Congress has disavowed any intent to occupy the field of drug regulation.
ture of drugs cannot consistently stand together with the CSA. For example, states cannot grow marijuana for qualified patients, as that would be engaging in conduct the CSA expressly forbids.
Nonetheless, though the CSA surely preempts some state marijuana regulations, its preemptive reach is not as broad as it could be under the anti-commandeering principles discussed above. First, Congress has disavowed any intent to occupy the field of drug regulation. As the Court's anti-commandeering decisions make clear, Congress may constitutionally bar states from adopting any regulation of marijuana whatsoever. As a practical matter, of course, doing so would not undo medical-use exemptions; it would simply require states to treat recreational use the same way-perfectly legal. Since there is no present indication that Congress has any interest in pushing states closer to full-scale legalization, it has left them free to regulate marijuana, so long as their regulations do not positively conflict with the CSA.
Second, the CSA itself does not proscribe all actions that conceivably contribute to drug use, nor does it proscribe omissions that do so. Broadly speaking, there are three ways one can violate the CSA. One is by violating its terms as a principal-such as by knowingly manufacturing, distributing, or possessing marijuana (or attempting to do so). Notably, the CSA does not proscribe omissions; that is, it does not impose any duty to act (generally applicable or otherwise), such as a duty to report known violations. 108 For this reason, the CSA does not oblige states to destroy marijuana they seize from qualified patients. The second way to violate the CSA is by conspiring with one or more persons to manufacture, distribute, or possess marijuana. 109 No overt act is necessary; only an agreement to commit a CSA violation is required for conviction. 110 Finally, the third way to violate the CSA is by aiding and abetting another person in manufacturing, distributing, or possessing marijuana.
111 Under federal law, aiding and abetting requires two basic elements: committing an overt act that assists the crime (the actus reus), and having the specific intent of facilitating the crime of another (the mens rea). 112 This sort of violation occurs, for example, when someone gives a drug dealer a ride to a drug transaction with the intent of facilitating that transaction, even if the driver does not gain financially from the crime. 113 The intent element circumscribes the preemptive impact of the CSA by sparing some state laws that have the effect, but not necessarily the intent, to facilitate CSA violations, such as the construction of a public road used by drug dealers.
In sum, Congress has expressed its intention to preempt some, but not all, of the state medical marijuana regulations that it could preempt consistently with the anticommandeering principles explained above. The CSA's preemption command could be restated as follows:
States may not take nor require anyone else to take any action that constitutes a violation of the substantive provisions of the CSA.
So interpreted, the preemption rule is constitutional. A violation of the CSA by state action would presumably constitute a departure from the state of nature.
The Legal Status of State Medical Marijuana Regulations
To determine whether state medical marijuana regulations are preemptable, and if so, whether they have indeed been preempted, one must examine the details of state medical marijuana provisions. This section examines five common provisions found in state medical marijuana laws, but the analyses could be applied to other marijuana regulations or to laws governing other subjects as well. The five provisions are: exemptions from state legal sanctions; state registration/ ID programs; laws shielding users, suppliers, and physicians from private sanctions; stateoperated marijuana cultivation/distribution programs; and laws requiring state agents to return marijuana to patients.
Just as Congress
cannot order states to criminalize behavior in the first instance, it cannot order states to maintain or restore criminal prohibitions.
Exemptions from State Sanctions. The core of all state medical marijuana programs are the state laws that exempt the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana for medical purposes from state-imposed legal sanctions. In enacting such laws, the states have clearly taken positive action, broadly defined. In substance, however, these exemptions merely restore the state of nature that existed until the early 1900s, when marijuana bans were first adopted. The states are doing no more than turning a blind eye to conduct Congress forbids; by exempting that conduct from state-imposed punishment, they do not require, or necessarily even facilitate it, in the relevant sense (i.e., against the stateof-nature baseline).
So understood, the exemptions cannot be preempted. A congressional statute purporting to do so would be unconstitutional. In effect, Congress would be ordering the state legislatures to recriminalize medical marijuana-to depart from the state of nature.
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Just as Congress cannot order states to criminalize behavior in the first instance, it cannot order states to maintain or restore criminal prohibitions.
In fact, the suggestion that state exemptions are, or even could be, preempted has troubling implications, given that the states commonly treat many drug cases more leniently than does the federal government, even outside the context of medical marijuana. State law enforcement agents drop cases federal authorities would probably prosecute if they had the resources. They expunge drug convictions that trigger federal supplemental sanctions. And they punish offenders less severely than would federal sentencing authorities. None of these decisions by the states has been declared preempted-and for good reason. 115 A ruling any other way would force states to criminalize drugs Congress has banned, adopt mandatory prosecution policies, raise sanctions, revise sentencing laws, and shift resources toward marijuana cases-effectively treading on whatever values the anti-commandeering rule seeks to promote. Under the CSA, states remain free to proscribe, or not to proscribe, the same drugs that Congress bans, and to punish violations more or less sternly than does Congress.
To be sure, private conduct has unquestionably changed as a result of the passage of the state exemptions. Citizens almost certainly use marijuana for medical purposes more frequently now than they did when states punished the conduct. But this change in behavior has resulted not because the states have departed from the state of nature, but because the states have (albeit only partially) restored it, by removing an obstacle not found in the state of nature-namely, the threat of state-imposed punishment for the possession, use, and cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes. It seems safe to suppose that in the state of nature, marijuana use would be rampant. Thus, in lifting their sanctions, the states have not taken positive action that can be preempted, a point that is easy to see once that action is judged against the appropriate baseline, which is the state of nature rather than the status quo (or the unadorned action/inaction paradigm).
Of course, states may be changing private conduct in a more subtle way too. By declining to punish marijuana use, especially after banning it for so long, the states are arguably suggesting that marijuana use is safe, beneficial, and not wicked. In doing so, states may incidentally change people's beliefs about marijuana use-not just from what they would be in the status quo, but from what those beliefs would be in the state of nature without such a government signal. If the state merely suggests that marijuana is not harmful, for example, individuals might feel more confident about experimenting with the drug. As a result, there may be more marijuana use and thus more CSA violations. Indeed, state exemptions probably have had an effect on public attitudes toward the drug.
One could argue that by expressing something about conduct-good or bad-exemptions represent a departure from the state of nature and thus constitute a form of preemptable positive action. But there must be some limit to what counts as preemptable States have not explicitly encouraged, chided, cajoled, or tricked people into using marijuana; indeed, they have gone out of their way to warn prospective users that they are still criminally liable under federal law.
Congress
In sum, Congress may not preempt the exemptions at the core of state medical marijuana laws. The exemptions merely restore the proverbial state of nature. To be sure, marijuana use has increased following passage of these laws, but the increase is not a result of anything the states have done. Rather, it is a result of what the states stopped doing: punishing medical use of the drug. Arguments that the CSA already does preempt-or that Congress even could preempt-state exemptions are mistaken. Properly understood, this is commandeering, not preemption.
Registration/ID and Licensing Programs. Registration/ID and licensing programs are similarly safe from preemption. The registration/ID and licensing process described earlier is designed largely to help state agents confirm whether a suspect in a criminal investigation is a legitimately qualified patient or supplier entitled to assert a state exemption. State registration/ID and licensing programs do not stop federal authorities from sanctioning registrants. They do not remove any privately created barriers to using marijuana-that is, barriers that exist in the state of nature. And they do not encourage anyone to use, grow, or distribute marijuana.
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In short, they do not make marijuana use any more likely than it would be in a state of nature, free of state legal sanctions. Since Congress cannot force states to impose legal sanctions, it cannot block states from adopting measures like registration and licensing that help them sort out who is exempted from sanctions-at least as long as the states do no more than that.
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Protection from Private Sanctions. State laws purporting to shield patients, caregivers, suppliers, and physicians from sanctions imposed by private persons or groups are on somewhat weaker footing. Some states, for example, bar private hospitals and clinics from taking adverse action (such as denying privileges) against any physician who recommends marijuana to a patient. Some states also bar landlords from terminating the lease of any qualified patient based solely on his or her status as such. Such protection is not, of course, found in the state of nature, where employers and landlords are free to punish marijuana use as they deem fit. To illustrate, suppose landlord L terminates tenant T's lease because T is a known medical marijuana patient. To assert state protection from eviction, T would need to initiate a lawsuit against L. The lawsuit would be heard and any remedy would be enforced by a state agent. The involvement of state agents would constitute a clear departure from the state of nature and would thus be preemptable.
Arguably, however, Congress has not yet sought to preempt all state laws that protect marijuana users and suppliers from private sanctions. Under the CSA, the question is whether such protection makes it impossible for someone to obey the CSA. 120 The answer may vary by context. If, for example, a state law required L to rent property to someone L Clearly, a state law ordering state agents to cultivate and distribute marijuana to private citizens creates a "positive conflict" with federal law.
knows will use it for growing marijuana, it would compel landlords to violate the CSA and would be preempted. 121 In other situations, however, state protection laws might not yet be preempted. It would be a stretch to say that a state requires anyone to violate the CSA, for example, when it bars an employer from firing one of its employees simply because the employee was using marijuana outside of work. Likewise, a state does not require a landlord to violate the CSA when it bars the landlord from evicting a tenant who might have used drugs away from the rental property. In these situations, the state laws shielding medical marijuana patients from private employment and rental sanctions would not necessarily be preempted by the CSA.
State Cultivation/Distribution Programs. A handful of states has proposed supplying marijuana directly to qualified patients via state-operated farms and distribution centers, which is similar to the method by which the federal government grows and distributes marijuana for use in research projects and in its own compassionate-use program. The CSA, however, clearly preempts any such state program. State cultivation and distribution of marijuana constitutes a departure from the state of nature. Though marijuana is available in the state of nature, the state distribution program would arguably provide something unique-a safe, cheap, consistent, and reliable supply of marijuana. Moreover, the CSA explicitly bars the cultivation and distribution of marijuana, leaving little doubt that Congress intended to preempt such state programs.
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To be sure, the preemptive effect of the CSA has been muddied somewhat by confusion over the meaning and significance of a relatively obscure provision of the CSA that grants immunity to state agents who enforce state drug laws. The provision has escaped the attention of the legal academy but has recently caught the attention of state courts attempting to reconcile state medical marijuana laws with the CSA. The provision, section 885(d), provides that "no civil or criminal liability shall be imposed . . . upon any duly authorized officer of any State . . . who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances." 123 On the one hand, the plain language of section 885(d), referring as it does to any state law "relating to controlled substances," suggests the provision would allow state officials to grow and distribute marijuana (or any other banned drug) as long as they do so under color of state, or even municipal, law-that is, while enforcing such law. A leading constitutional law scholar (qua advocate, not commentator), 124 among others, has pushed this reasoning, and so far two state courts, including the Supreme Court of California, have adopted it, albeit in a different context (the return of marijuana, as discussed below). 125 On the other hand, this expansive interpretation of section 885(d) immunity is difficult to reconcile with the CSA's express preemption language and congressional intent. First, granting state police (or other state officials) immunity under section 885(d) for distributing or manufacturing marijuana would render the express preemption language of section 903 meaningless. As explained above, section 903 means that states may not engage in, conspire to engage in, nor aid and abet conduct that violates the CSA. Clearly, a state law ordering state agents to cultivate and distribute marijuana to private citizens creates a "positive conflict" with federal law. The law would therefore be preempted and unenforceable, and a state agent cannot be immune from federal prosecution under section 885(d) for enforcing an unenforceable state statute. 126 Second, a narrower interpretation of the immunity provision also more closely comports with Congress's purpose in conferring immunity on law enforcement agents in the first place. The purpose of section 885(d) immunity is readily apparent. In order to handle narcotics legally during drug investigations, both state and federal law enforcement agents must have immunity. Without
The anticommandeering rule permits Congress to encourage positive action it cannot oblige states to take.
it undercover agents and informants could not feel secure handling narcotics in the course of a drug sting; in theory, by handling the drugs, they could face the same charges as the drug pushers they investigate. Yet such technical violations of the CSA clearly help facilitate the Act's overriding purpose of eradicating the illicit drug trade. Hence, granting immunity for such infractions makes perfect sense. Congress could have relied on the good sense of U.S. attorneys not to prosecute such violations, but one can hardly fault Congress for wanting to codify immunity and remove any doubts. But recognizing immunity broader than this would generate results that seem absurd in light of Congress's underlying purpose. 127 Whatever one thinks of the wisdom of granting such broad immunity, it seems implausible to suppose that Congress had anything like this in mind when it enacted section 885(d).
The CSA's clear ban on state-run farms and dispensaries explains why states have thus far balked at supplying marijuana directly, in spite of the obvious advantages of directly controlling the growing and distribution of marijuana in medical-use programs. A few states and cities have proposed state/local distribution centers, but none has followed through and actually implemented one.
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State Return of Seized Marijuana. States with medical marijuana exemptions commonly require law enforcement agents to return any marijuana that was seized from a qualified patient in the course of a criminal investigation. Such provisions have provoked much litigation (mostly brought by law enforcement agents) and debate, but as yet there are no satisfactory answers to the underlying question: Are these state laws preempted?
On the one hand, by returning marijuana state agents would seem to take positive action that violates the CSA-namely, distributing marijuana. As defined under the CSA, distribution simply means to transfer drugs from one person to another; no money need be exchanged. 129 Hence, at first glance, it would seem that laws requiring state agents to return marijuana to qualified patients are preempted because they require state agents to violate the CSA-this clearly poses a positive conflict with the CSA.
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On the other hand, returning seized marijuana to its original possessor merely restores the state of nature. The quantity of marijuana in existence and the identity of the possessor are no different than had the state government never seized the drugs. Viewed this way, preemption of these state laws would compel state action and not merely block it: state agents who have seized marijuana would now be obliged to store it, destroy it, or transfer it to federal authorities. As discussed above, this is an obligation Congress may not impose unless it imposes a similar obligation on private citizens as well. And it appears Congress has not yet done so: private schools, stadiums, airlines, and shopping malls seize drugs from time to time, yet it appears none of these private entities is required to turn the drugs over to federal authorities (though most do so anyway) as opposed to their owner. Until Congress imposes a generally applicable duty to store, destroy, or turn in seized marijuana-and assuming that it could do so, laws ordering state agents to return seized marijuana to its original owners are not preempted.
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Congress's Other Options
Even if Congress cannot compel states to abandon their exemptions or most of the other medical marijuana provisions discussed above, it can try to persuade them to do so voluntarily. The anti-commandeering rule permits Congress to encourage positive action it cannot oblige states to take. When it comes to marijuana, Congress could offer states money or regulatory power in return for a promise to recriminalize marijuana use for medical purposes. As long as the inducement Congress offers is not coercive, it would not offend existing anti-commandeering doctrine.
Congress has immense fiscal resources relative to the states, and the Court has im-As regards state marijuana laws, the threat from Congress's conditional spending and preemption powers seems more apparent than real.
posed few meaningful restrictions on how Congress may employ those resources to extract conditions from the states. 132 It seems clear that Congress could offer the states grants in return for legislation that eliminates exemptions and reinstates categorical criminal bans on marijuana. Because the grants could, in theory, be refused, they do not compel state action, so there would be no commandeering problem. 133 Congress also has expansive regulatory authority that it can promise to share in return for similar concessions. Namely, Congress could agree to spare (i.e., not preempt) state bans on recreational marijuana in return for the states' agreement to broaden those bans to include medical marijuana. 134 Unlike state exemptions, state bans on marijuana are subject to congressional preemption because they-or more precisely, the sanctions behind themconstitute positive action that departs from the state of nature; after all, legal sanctions for drug use are not found in the state of nature. In essence, Congress could threaten to preempt all state marijuana laws (i.e., preempt the entire field) unless states agreed to adopt laws banning marijuana categorically as Congress does. This may seem unfair, coercive, and perhaps unsound, but the Supreme Court has upheld conditional preemption legislation giving states equally dire options. 135 The conventional wisdom suggests that Congress's conditional spending and conditional preemption powers are federalism's Trojan Horses-powers that enable Congress to sidestep jurisprudential limits on its authority and accomplish otherwise impermissible objectives. 136 As regards state marijuana laws, however, the threat from Congress's conditional spending and preemption powers seems more apparent than real. It seems implausible that Congress could muster the votes needed to pass legislation conditioning federal grants of money or power on the agreement of states to abandon permissive marijuana laws. Congress has banned marijuana and that ban seems likely to remain the official federal policy for the foreseeable future, but the opportunity for Congress to take any further action against medical marijuana (e.g., by passing legislation designed to repeal state exemptions) has clearly passed. Public support for medical marijuana exemptions has grown considerably since the CSA was originally enacted; indeed, a strong majority of citizensover 70 percent in most polls-now supports medical exemptions for marijuana. 137 This majority, although perhaps not large enough to formally repeal the categorical ban, is large enough to block measures that would reinforce it. 138 In fact, Congress has rejected recent proposals that would withhold grant monies from local law enforcement agencies in medical marijuana states and redirect the monies to federal drug enforcement agencies instead. 139 In sum, the anti-commandeering rule bars Congress from preempting state medical marijuana exemptions and accompanying registration/ID programs. To be sure, medical use of marijuana will surely rise once states legalize it. However, that is not because the states have removed any privately created obstacles, such as wealth constraints, that inhibit marijuana use-that is, not because states have departed from the proverbial state of nature. Some state laws, including those involving state distribution of marijuana, may be, and have been, preempted. Congress could go a step further and preempt state laws protecting citizens from private sanctions, but any further action-including action to exert pressure on states to abandon exemptions voluntarily-seems highly unlikely. The window of opportunity may have closed already, as public support for medical marijuana, while perhaps not yet high enough to undo the federal ban altogether, may at least block more aggressive congressional efforts to undo state laws. This means that most state medical marijuana laws remain in place. 140 In other words, the discovery that states have more de jure power than previously recognized would constitute a somewhat hollow victory for state lawmakers and medical marijuana proponents, unless that de jure power also carries practical ramifications. At bottom, the question is which law has more sway over private conduct: a state law legalizing that conduct or a federal law banning it?
De Facto State Power
Enforcement of Legal Sanctions
According to neoclassical economic theory, laws need the backing of incentives (carrots or sticks) to change human behavior. If the government wants to promote a certain type of behavior, it must reward that behavior (such as with a subsidy). Conversely, if the government wants to curtail the behavior, it must punish the behavior (with fines or jail time). Viewed from this perspective, the federal ban on medical marijuana likely does little to deter possession or cultivation/distribution of the drug. Though the CSA certainly threatens harsh sanctions, the federal government does not have the resources to impose them frequently enough to make a meaningful impact on proscribed behavior. 141 To begin, the federal law enforcement apparatus is small. The federal government employs 105,000 law enforcement agents, only about 4,400 of whom work for the DEA, the lead federal agency on drug crimes. The remainder work for dozens of departmentsFederal Bureau of Investiagtion (FBI); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and so on-and spend only a fraction of their time handling drug crimes.
142 All told, federal agents made 154,000 arrests in 2007-30,000 for all drug offenses, including 7,276 for marijuana.
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These figures amount to only 1 percent of all criminal arrests, 1.6 percent of all drug arrests, and less than 1 percent of all marijuana arrests made in the United States that year.
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Compared to the number of federal law enforcement agents, the number of potential targets in the war on marijuana is enormous.
146 After all, it is not as if these medicinal users wear a sign identifying themselves as such. Assuming it must select marijuana cases at random, the federal government, on average, would need to pursue roughly 4 marijuana possession cases in the medical exemption states before coming across just one case that a state would dismiss pursuant to a medical exemption.
Given limited resources and a huge number of targets, the current expected sanction for medical marijuana users is quite low. Suppose that only 5 percent of all marijuana offenders are currently discovered by law enforcement (state and federal combined).
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Of that figure, only one percent of offenders are handled by federal law enforcement. Assuming no cooperation between the sovereigns, only 0.05 percent-or roughly 1 in 2,000-of medical marijuana users would be uncovered by federal authorities following current practices. Hence, even if nominal federal sanctions are set very high (as they currently are), the expected legal sanction remains quite low. For example, a fine of $100,000 results in an expected sanction of only $50 ($100,000 × .0005), a price many people would be willing to pay for access to marijuana-especially considering that many deem it a life-changing medicine.
Not Immediately following passage of the 1996 California Compassionate Use Act, federal drug czar Barry McCaffrey issued a strongly worded statement outlining the federal government's strategy to thwart the initiative. 149 One part of that strategy was to revoke the DEA registration of any physician who recommended marijuana to a patient, on the grounds that recommendation of an illegal drug is against the public interest.
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Such registration is necessary to legally prescribe, dispense, or possess any controlled substance, including medications; without it, most physicians cannot practice medicine. 151 Not surprisingly, many physicians would be unwilling to prescribe marijuana (or any other Schedule I substance) if doing so jeopardized their DEA registration and exposed them to criminal sanctions for aiding and abetting CSA violations.
The states, however, seemingly anticipated this roadblock. All medical marijuana states require only a physician's recommendation, and not a prescription, to use marijuana legally under state law. To the DEA, this distinction was of no moment; it viewed both prescribing and recommending proscribed drugs as violations of federal law. A federal appellate court, however, disagreed. The court found that the DEA policy violated physicians' First Amendment rights to speak to their patients about the pros and cons of possible treatments.
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The DEA policy was constitutionally problematic because it explicitly discriminated on the basis of both the content (marijuana) and viewpoint (pro-marijuana) of physician speech. 153 The court found there was no adequate justification for the DEA policy. According to the court, a recommendation, unlike a prescription, entails no more than simply discussing the pros and cons of marijuana use; it does not necessarily encourage or aid and abet marijuana use. 154 The court thus issued an injunction blocking the DEA from denying or rescinding the DEA registration of physicians who merely recommend marijuana. Though the court's reasoning may not be unassailable, its decision has been followed nationally, and the DEA no longer threatens to sanction physicians for merely recommending marijuana. Thus, by carefully circumscribing the task that physicians must perform, the states have prevented the federal government from squeezing one of the most important chokepoints in state medical marijuana programs.
A second federal strategy-and one not constrained by the First Amendment-has been to target marijuana growers and suppliers, a second potential bottleneck in state programs. As mentioned previously, the DEA has raided nearly 160 medical marijuana dispensaries since 2009. It has also commenced forfeiture proceedings against landlords who knowingly rent property to marijuana growers. Targeting suppliers as opposed to users has two obvious advantages. First, there are far fewer of them. Some large-scale marijuana cooperatives in California purport to serve thousands of patients, so shutting down even one of them should, in theory, impact thousands of users. Second, the penalties for cultivation and distribution of marijuana are significantly higher than for simple possession, the charge most users would face. The biggest marijuana suppliers face possible life imprisonment and a $20 million fine under the CSA, meaning that expected legal sanctions will be high even if the probability of being detected by federal law enforcement is not.
Nonetheless, efforts to take down large marijuana suppliers have probably had only a limited impact on the supply or use of marijuana. 155 One of the main reasons these efforts have failed is because there are few barriers to entry in the marijuana market. 156 Marijuana can be produced in almost any climate. Unlike other drugs, no special skills, technologies, or special inputs are needed to cultivate the plant. Indeed, one can easily obtain advice on how to grow the drug at bookstores and via various websites. 157 This lack of barriers implies that if the federal government shuts down one large mari-
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State law enforcement agents are under no obligation to help Congress enforce its laws. juana supplier, another one could fairly easily take its place. Shut down all of the large growers, and smaller operators could step in to satisfy demand. Shut them all down-an expensive and unlikely endeavor-and many marijuana users would simply grow the stuff themselves. To be sure, campaigns against large suppliers could dent the supply of marijuana and perhaps its use in the short-run. However, as long as demand for the drug remains high, federal eradication campaigns may simply push marijuana production into smaller operations that are harder to detect; more costly to prosecute, given their sheer numbers; and subject to lower sanctions under the CSA. 158 Simply put, without a substantial increase in federal law enforcement resources, the campaign against marijuana growers would likely be futile. Moreover, such a campaign may have an unintended and deleterious consequence: to the extent users turn to smaller (and more numerous) suppliers or simply grow the drug themselves, the federal campaign would frustrate state efforts to supervise the supply of marijuana. 159 Apart from dramatically increasing the federal law enforcement budget, Congress has few options for giving the CSA some bite. It could, in theory, empower private citizens to enforce the ban the way it now authorizes private plaintiffs to enforce Title VII bans on employment discrimination, but such a proposal seems unlikely to succeed. 160 Likewise, states probably have enough law enforcement resources to deter medical marijuanathey already handle one hundred times as many marijuana cases as the federal government-but state law enforcement agents are under no obligation to help Congress enforce its laws. Just as Congress may not commandeer state legislatures to ban medical marijuana, it may not compel state officers to help Congress enforce its own ban either. 161 Hence, deterring the use or supply of marijuana through legal sanctions, even in just 18 states, would require a dramatic increase in the federal criminal caseload and a corresponding increase in federal law enforcement staffing levels. This is a highly unlikely scenario-even more so once one considers that the surge would need to be maintained for the long haul. 162 
Beyond Legal Sanctions-Why People Obey Law
At this point, a neoclassical economist would probably surmise that the federal ban does not significantly reduce the use or supply of marijuana because the expected legal sanctions for disobeying the ban are, for many people, outweighed by the expected benefits of disobedience. Contrary to this prediction, however, people often do obey the law, even when they do not expect to be punished by the government for non-compliance-that is, even when they lack strong legal incentives to obey. This paradox suggests that law can affect behavior without granting formal legal rewards or imposing formal legal sanctions. Of course, these incentives help, but lawmakers do not necessarily need them to secure compliance with their edicts. The realization that people obey laws even when they do not face high expected legal sanctions suggests that the categorical congressional ban on marijuana could curb marijuana use even if it is seldom enforced; in other words, the states' de facto power may depend on more than just the federal government's enforcement resources.
Apart from imposing legal sanctions, there are three means by which lawmakers can curtail proscribed behaviors: reshaping internal preferences, invoking moral obligations, and publicizing social norms. To the extent Congress is able to wield these behavior-shaping forces, it may have more de facto power than previously suggested. Conversely, to the extent the states are able to wield these forces and thereby foster-or at least enable-behavior that contravenes federal bans, they may have even more de facto power than a narrow focus on law enforcement resources alone would suggest.
Internal Preferences. Some people refrain from proscribed behavior not because they fear being punished, but because they simply do not want to engage in it. Marijuana As a general matter, the public does not trust federal authorities very much.
use is an obvious example. Some people may refrain from using marijuana because they deem it ineffectual, dangerous, or depraved. Though they have not actually been deterred by legal sanctions, these people act as though they had. Though it is commonly assumed that our preferences to engage in or refrain from a given behavior are exogenous to law, lawmakers arguably can change people's views of a given behavior, and thus their inclination to engage in that behavior. 163 One way lawmakers can do this is by passing laws that ban, and therefore condemn, the behavior. The theory is that the behavior-like the use of marijuana-will seem more dangerous or depraved if the law formally condemns it. A second way lawmakers can shape preferences is by educating (or more pejoratively, indoctrinating) the public. The federal government has, in fact, employed this strategy in its war on marijuana. Since 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has spent more than $1.5 billion on an aggressive ad campaign designed to discourage marijuana use-medical or otherwise-particularly among youth, largely by portraying the drug as dangerous, wicked, and uncool. 164 To the extent lawmakers can shape preferences and redefine self-interest, they can diminish citizens' desire to engage in prohibited activity without having to impose costly legal sanctions. 165 The federal government's campaign against marijuana, however, appears not to have altered public perceptions of marijuana use. Studies have shown that the anti-marijuana campaign has not reduced the likelihood of marijuana use, nor has it changed public attitudes toward the drug. 166 People do, of course, refrain from using marijuana because they believe it is ineffectual, dangerous, or wicked, but those beliefs appear not to have been changed or reinforced by the OND-CP's aggressive anti-marijuana campaigns.
The reason the federal government's campaign is not shaping preferences may be that citizens simply do not trust the messenger. Not surprisingly, the persuasiveness of any campaign may depend as much on its source as on its content. Imagine, for example, Cheech Marin trying to convince students not to use drugs. The government's ability to shape citizens' preferences hinges in large part on lawmakers' credibility and trustworthiness. 167 And as a general matter, the public does not trust federal authorities very much, particularly compared to their state counterparts. 168 When it comes to drug policy in particular, the public seems to harbor doubts about the motive behind certain federal drug policies. One common concern is that the federal marijuana ban is not premised on science but is instead motivated by the financial interests of large drug manufacturers, which could lose billions in drug sales if an ordinary plant were to displace some of their patented medicines, or so the story goes. 169 Whether such beliefs are correct is beside the point; what matters is simply that as long as the federal government suffers a trust deficit, it will have a difficult time nudging people's beliefs in the direction federal lawmakers deem desirable.
State lawmakers, by contrast, arguably have more influence over public beliefs and preferences. Owing to a variety of factors, citizens on average deem state and local governments far more trustworthy than the national government. 170 Consequently, state lawmakers may have an advantage vis-á-vis their federal counterparts when it comes to manipulating citizens' views of marijuana use or other behaviors. By legalizing medical use of marijuana, for example, state laws may have softened public attitudes towards it. The use of marijuana may seem more efficacious and less dangerous or wicked because it is permitted by state law. In addition, though states have not waged a public relations campaign to match that of the ONDCP, proponents of medical marijuana laws have run effective political campaigns in getting such laws passed. Those campaigns have generally portrayed medical marijuana in a very sympathetic light; they have portrayed exemptions as rooted in compassion and hope for the sick, rather than being about dangerous In theory, a lawmaking body can draw upon its legitimacy to goad compliance with laws the people (or some portion thereof) deem foolish or unwise.
and reckless indulgences for the wicked. 171 Federal drug authorities clearly appear troubled by the signal they believe is being sent by state medical marijuana laws and the political campaigns behind them. Indeed, their opposition to state medical marijuana laws stems in large part from the widely shared view that these state laws are, in fact, changing people's beliefs about the dangers of marijuana use, in particular, and perhaps drug use more generally. General Barry McCaffrey, the former federal drug czar, succinctly made the point to Congress: "Referenda that tell our children that marijuana is a 'medicine' send them the wrong signal about the dangers of illegal drugs-increasing the likelihood that more children will turn to drugs."
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Moral Obligation to Obey Law. Some people refrain from behavior because they feel morally obliged to obey a legal prohibition. In this sense, people are prone to obey law not because they think it is in their self-interest (narrowly defined) to do so, but because it is the right, the moral thing to do; it is what people should do, even when they disagree with the law. 173 In his seminal work on obedience to law, Tom Tyler found that "[c]itizens who view legal authority as legitimate are generally more likely to comply with the law." 174 Tyler explains that "citizens may comply with the law because they view the legal authority they are dealing with as having a legitimate right to dictate their behavior; this represents an acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into line with the dictates of an external authority." 175 In theory, a lawmaking body can draw upon its legitimacy to goad compliance with laws the people (or some portion thereof) deem foolish or unwise. 176 To the extent Congress can oblige people to follow its marijuana ban, it may have more practical (de facto) authority than the story sketched out earlier suggests, for it would not need to hire more federal agents, build more federal prisons, or buy more television ads to curb marijuana use. Indeed, as noted above, some scholars have dismissed state medical marijuana laws as ineffectual and largely symbolic measures because they believe most people are unwilling, on moral grounds, to defy Congress's ban. 177 Nonetheless, in spite of the generalized obligation to obey law that many people feel, the obligation to obey the federal marijuana ban is probably quite weak, for two main reasons. First, violations of the ban are commonplace, thus undermining its moral influence. When everyone knows a law is not being observed, the moral obligation to obey that law is weakened and compliance suffers. 178 As Dan Kahan explains:
Most individuals regard compliance with law to be morally appropriate. But most also loathe being taken advantage of. The latter sensibility can easily subvert the former if individuals perceive that those around them are routinely violating a particular law. When others refuse to reciprocate, submission to a burdensome legal duty is likely to feel more servile than moral.
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Congress's ban may have lost its moral influence because so many people flout it, and federal authorities have done little thus far to punish them. In other words, the lack of enforcement of the federal ban may have undermined not only the deterrent effect of the ban's sanctions, but also the deterrent effect of the generalized moral obligation to obey the law.
Second, people may feel relieved of the obligation to obey the federal ban because state law permits marijuana use. 180 It is, of course, possible to obey both state and federal law by not using marijuana at all, but citizens may dismiss the obligation to obey federal law when they deem the state-and not Congress-as having the "legitimate right to dictate their behavior" regarding marijuana use. 181 Congress's perceived right to dictate behavior may be even weaker in the states where medical marijuana laws were passed by voter referenda. In such states, people State and federal laws send conflicting signals about the social acceptability of using the drug as medicine.
may see themselves collectively as having the exclusive right to dictate marijuana policy, in which case the federal ban will command very little moral authority.
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Social Norms (and Sanctions). One final reason why people obey law has to do with social norms. Social norms are non-legal rules and precepts (e.g., "don't cheat on your spouse") that define what constitutes appropriate behavior and beliefs within a given community-a nation, state, city, neighborhood, workplace, church, and so on. Such norms are backed by a variety of non-legal sanctions (e.g., shame), giving these norms a powerful influence over behavior that may rival that of law itself. 183 Like law, and in contrast to personal beliefs or the internalized moral obligation to obey law, social norms exert external pressure on individuals to conform. Unlike law, however, that external pressure is applied by civil society rather than the government.
To the extent lawmakers can rely upon norms to discourage behavior they deem undesirable, norms greatly reduce the need to impose separate, costly legal sanctions. 184 On one view of the legislative process, lawmakers can shape social norms by manipulating whether society condemns or condones a given behavior, similarly to the way they can shape personal beliefs about that behavior. 185 Norms, of course, put added pressure on group members to behave a particular way (in addition to the pressure exerted by their own personal preferences). Indeed, because of this pressure to conform, norms may influence the behavior even of those outlier members who remain unconvinced by the government's message (i.e., members whose personal beliefs do not comport with the norm). Because the means by which lawmakers shape norms are largely the same as those by which they shape personal beliefs, there is no need to discuss them again here. Suffice to say, states again have the upper hand in this regard. Just as they may be at an advantage when they seek to manipulate personal beliefs due to their greater trustworthiness, the states may be at an advantage vis-à-vis Congress when manipulating social norms as well.
On another view of the legislative process, norms are entrenched; lawmakers must take norms as they find them, meaning they cannot necessarily control whether society condemns or condones any given behavior. This, in effect, makes norms a double-edged sword. 186 Nonetheless, even if they cannot necessarily change the content of norms, lawmakers can augment or diminish the influence of a norm on behavior by educating citizens about the content and potency of that norm.
The passage of a new law may help reduce citizens' uncertainty about norms, particularly when they are in flux. The basic idea is that citizens demand laws that comport with community norms, and lawmakers, subject to constraints such as majority rule, respond by supplying such laws. Hence, the passage of a law banning marijuana use suggests the existence of a similar social norm condemning marijuana use-that is, it educates citizens about the content and potency of community norms concerning marijuana.
In turn, clarifying the content and potency of norms-particularly new or evolving norms-can change people's behavior. To illustrate, suppose X is considering smoking marijuana to treat his glaucoma but is uncertain whether society now condemns use of marijuana for such purposes. As Robert Scott explains in a different example, the passage of a law regulating marijuana use provides X with Bayesian information concerning what his fellow citizens now think about it. 187 The law thus helps X more accurately determine the expected social sanction, if any, for using marijuana. 188 For example, the passage of a law proscribing marijuana signals society's disapproval of it. It informs X that he should expect to incur a cost apart from legal sanctions for smoking marijuana. On account of this cost, X might refrain from using marijuana, despite the absence of formal legal sanctions and even though X feels he might benefit from marijuana use.
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The strict marijuana ban is out of sync with current social norms.
In the case of marijuana, of course, state and federal laws send conflicting signals about the social acceptability of using the drug as medicine. The CSA strongly suggests societal disapproval, but permissive state laws suggest societal tolerance-and possibly even approval-of medical use of the drug. If citizens take their cues from federal law, Congress may have far more de facto impact on marijuana use than suggested earlier. Conversely, if citizens take their cues from state law, Congress's influence in this domain is even weaker than previously noted.
When it comes to educating citizens about norms, state laws generally give citizens more current and relevant information, and as a result are more likely to shape their choices than are federal laws. For one thing, state laws typically convey more up-to-date information about current social norms. The main reason is that states employ comparatively majoritarian-friendly lawmaking processes, such as referenda, that make updating state laws to keep up with changes in societal views much easier. 189 To be sure, passage of a congressional law regulating an activity signals something about how the nation feels about that activity when the law is passed. Indeed, because it takes super-majority support to push any measure through Congress, laws that do emerge from the national process may signal a strong national consensus and norm. But because federal laws are so resistant to change, the signal broadcast by the passage of federal law fades quickly with time.
The CSA illustrates the point. The federal ban on medical use of marijuana was adopted nearly 40 years ago, when Congress placed marijuana on Schedule I of the CSA. Whatever society's views were circa 1970, they have since changed: the strict marijuana ban is out of sync with current social norms. Society no longer condemns the use of marijuana for medical purposes (assuming it ever did). On the contrary, opinion polls consistently show more than 70 percent of the American public now approves of the use of marijuana for medical conditions. But given the enormous challenge of changing any congressional law, the resilience of the now seemingly passé federal ban is hardly surprising. 190 It would take an even more dramatic shift in public opinion to formally undo it.
By contrast, state medical marijuana laws have all been enacted more recently than the federal ban, starting with California in 1996 and continuing through Massachusetts in 2012. Many of these state laws have been supported by large majorities. Support for Michigan's Proposition 1, for example, topped 63 percent in 2008. The passage of 18 state laws, many by wide margins, signals that society is more likely to support than to censure medical use of marijuana. Thus, there is virtually no social sanction for using marijuana for medical purposes-or at least no consensus to condemn such behavior-in these states.
In addition to being more current, state laws also convey more accurate information about local norms. This is important because norms held by local society exert far more influence on one's behavior than do norms held by distant strangers. 191 After all, we interact more-and care more about our standing-with neighbors, co-workers, close family, and fellow worshipers than we do with people who live far away. Thus, for example, the passage of California's Compassionate Use Act in 1996 may have signaled the emergence of a new, more permissive norm governing the medical use of marijuana in that state. This event may have been enough to foster use of the drug in California, even if drug norms elsewhere had not yet changed.
In short, even if they cannot shield people from federal legal sanctions or change federal law in the short term, states can make people feel secure from social sanctions by credibly signaling public approval of once taboo conduct. 192 In this way, states wield another powerful influence on private behavior, an influence that is not necessarily subject to congressional preemption.
To avoid sympathetic juries, the DEA has been attacking medical marijuana suppliers primarily by using civil injunctions and civil sanctions such as forfeiture.
legal sanctions on those who violate the federal ban. For example, jurors may be unwilling to convict people who use marijuana for medical purposes (or the people who help them) if they know that local society generally approves of medical marijuana. 194 In fact, in order to avoid sympathetic juries, the DEA has been attacking medical marijuana suppliers primarily by using civil injunctions and civil sanctions such as forfeiture, which are tactics that do not require jury participation. 195 Given the federal government's limited enforcement resources and its comparatively weak influence over personal preferences, moral obligations, and social norms, many citizens are not dissuaded from using marijuana by the existence of the federal ban. States have succeeded at removing-or at least diminishing-the biggest obstacles curbing medical use of marijuana: state legal sanctions and the personal, moral, and social disapproval that may once have inhibited use of the drug. To be sure, they cannot eliminate all of the barriers to medical use-those that exist in the state of nature (e.g., wealth constraints) or those posed by federal sanctions-but they have gone quite far, as participation rates in state programs demonstrate: roughly 1,400,000 people may now be using marijuana legally for medical purposes in 18 states. In short, though Congress's categorical ban on marijuana has been held constitutional by a majority of the Supreme Court, state exemptions have become the de facto governing law of the land in these states.
Conclusion
Medical marijuana is but one example of a much broader phenomenon: situations in which states legalize private activity that Congress proscribes. Over the past few decades, the federal government has sought to ban a number of activities states have legalized, including use of marijuana for medical purposes, certain abortion procedures, physician-assisted suicide, needle exchange programs, and possession of certain types of firearms, to name a few. 196 In spite of its distinct character and prevalence, however, this category of state/federal conflict-pitting permissive state laws against restrictive federal ones-has largely escaped the attention of legal scholars.
Using medical marijuana as a timely case study, I have analyzed the legal status and practical significance of the permissive state laws that form the heart of this distinct category of conflict. To analyze the states' de jure authority, I developed a new analytical framework for distinguishing between permissible preemption and unconstitutional commandeering-the state-of-nature benchmark. The state-of-nature benchmark explains why state laws legalizing behavior that Congress bans remain in force, even as state laws banning behavior that Congress legalizes do not. In the latter case, state laws are preempted, barring contrary congressional intent, because the threat of state sanctions would discourage the behavior Congress has sought to foster or at least tolerate. The imposition of legal sanctions constitutes a departure from the state of nature, and thus an action Congress may block. In the former case, however, state laws survive because removing state sanctions does not encourage the behavior Congress has sought to eliminate, at least in the legally relevant sense-as measured against the behavior's prevalence in the state of nature. The repeal of legal sanctions merely restores the state of nature; the fact that it results in more violations of federal law does not thereby make state permissiveness preemptable.
The state-of-nature benchmark provides a useful heuristic for assessing whether Congress may preempt any given state law. Consider, for example, recent proposals made by a few states to legalize sports gambling under state law. 197 The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 purports to preempt such proposals by making it unlawful for states to "sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law" sports gambling schemes not in existence State laws legalizing medical use of marijuana now constitute the de facto governing law in 18 states.
prior to the Act. 198 Much of the Act's language is unproblematic. Operating a sports gambling scheme, for example, constitutes a clear departure from the state of nature and is thus subject to congressional override. 199 However, to the extent the Act seeks to preempt state laws that merely authorize sports gambling, it raises serious constitutional questions. 200 This language would seemingly bar states from repealing existing prohibitions on sports gambling-that is, it would force them to remain outside the state of nature, in violation of the anti-commandeering rule. 201 This paper also explains why permissive state laws matter: states are able to foster, or at least enable, federally proscribed behavior, even when they cannot engage in, require, or facilitate it-or block federal authorities from imposing their own harsh sanctions on it-that is, even when states cannot depart from the state of nature. The federal government does not have the law enforcement resources needed to enforce its bans vigorously (although this could vary somewhat by context), and its ability to marshal the most important private and social behavioral influences to enhance compliance with its bans is likewise limited. 202 As a practical matter, by simply legalizing a given behavior, the states can remove or at least diminish the most significant barriers inhibiting that behavior, including state legal sanctions (which often can be enforced vigorously) and the personal, moral, and social disapproval of the behavior as well.
Though Congress has banned marijuana outright through legislation that has survived Supreme Court scrutiny, state laws legalizing medical use of marijuana not only remain in effect, they now constitute the de facto governing law in 18 states. These state laws and most related regulations have not been-and, more interestingly, cannot bepreempted by Congress, given constraints imposed on Congress's preemption power by the anti-commandeering rule, properly understood. Just as importantly, these state laws matter; state legalization of medical marijuana has not only eliminated the most relevant legal barrier to using the drug, it has arguably fostered more tolerant personal and social attitudes toward the drug. In sum, medical marijuana use has survived and, indeed, thrived in the shadow of the federal ban. The war over medical marijuana may be largely over, though skirmishes will undoubtedly continue, but contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the states, and not the federal government, that have emerged the victors in this struggle. Supremacy, in short, has its limits. 2. By legalize, I mean the state government permits some private conduct to occur free of legal sanctions, both civil and criminal. It means something more than decriminalize, which merely removes the threat of criminal sanctions. 20. Alaska Stat. § 11.71.090(a) (2009) (registration is essential; no defense of medical necessity without it). In a few states that seem to require registration, the requirement has not yet been 29 fully tested (e.g., it's not clear whether otherwise qualified patients will necessarily be barred from asserting the defense if they failed to pre-register).
Notes
21. See, for example, Wash. Rev. Code § 69.51A.040 (person who meets requirements under statute may raise affirmative defense against marijuana charge); People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 464, 482 (2002) (in order to dismiss drug charges, defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt as to his or her qualifications under California CUA). California has recently adopted a voluntary ID card program, under which medical marijuana users can obtain an ID card to enable them to prove their eligibility for the state's exemption more easily. To obtain the card, users must submit required documentation to a county health department for review, but the program is not mandatory. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11362.71(f).
22. Minors must usually take additional steps in order to use marijuana for medical purposes with the state's blessing. The minor's physician must advise him or her of the risks of using marijuana; at least one parent (and sometimes both) must consent in writing; and a parent must agree to serve as the minor's caregiver and supervise his or her use of the drug. The federal courts could, in theory, create a medical marijuana exemption by recognizing a defense of medical necessity to the CSA. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 (1980) (suggesting, in dicta, that courts retain power to recognize a necessity defense even when Congress has not explicitly provided for one). The Supreme Court, however, has explicitly foreclosed this option. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (concluding that terms of the statute "leave no doubt that the [medical necessity] defense is unavailable" under the CSA, given Congress's determination that "marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception"). In any event, not every person authorized to use marijuana under state law would necessarily be able to satisfy the common law requirements of the necessity defense. Under the common law defense of necessity, defendant must prove that: he chose the lesser of two evils, that he acted to prevent imminent harm, that he reasonably believed his conduct would avoid the other harm, and that there were no alternatives to violating the law. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2007).
The federal courts have likewise refused to recognize any constitutional due process right of access to marijuana for medical treatment. Ibid., p. 866 (concluding that the Constitution "does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical marijuana prescribed by a licensed physician to alleviate excruciating pain and human suffering"). 64. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 ("Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial' . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity."). , at B1 (reporting that the DEA had sent a letter warning landlords of the city's marijuana dispensaries that they faced forfeiture proceedings and possible criminal sanctions for renting property to drug cooperatives; also noting that one-quarter of San Francisco's dispensaries had closed in response to the letter).
87. The DEA once threatened to rescind the prescription-writing authority of physicians who recommend marijuana.
Criminal law expert Susan Klein insists, for example, that:
[W]hen a state chooses to pursue an independent moral norm and makes that choice clear to its citizens . . . some citizens will engage in this behavior. If this same behavior is criminalized federally, however, the behavior will be chilled. Even though federal resources for criminal prosecutions are small, the mere threat of a federal prosecution will stop all but the most hardy from engaging in this behavior, notwithstanding its legality on the state level. 118. Indeed, if anything, licensing and registration should curb the marijuana market, because these programs help states to prevent fraudulent assertions of medical exemptions and to enforce a growing body of regulations that limit the operation of marijuana dispensaries.
119. In theory, of course, Congress could preempt the entire field of marijuana regulations, thereby mooting registration programs; after all, the states would no longer need to distinguish between medical/non-medical users because they could punish neither group. See 121. 21 U.S.C § 856 (making it a crime to rent property knowing it is being used to manufacture, distribute, or consume illicit drugs).
ing, 2013) (suggesting that the agents would not commit a CSA offense if courts recognize an "innocent distribution" defense).
131. It is thus unnecessary to address the claim made by some state courts that 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) immunizes state agents from criminal liability for the return of marijuana. That provision-and the problems confronting state court interpretations of it-is discussed above.
132. In particular, the conditions must be stated unambiguously; they must bear some relationship to how the funds will be used; and the funds offered must not be so large as to practically compel acceptance. states, most notably, California, may have more users per capita than the estimate suggests since they recognize more qualifying conditions than does Oregon. In spite of these concerns, however, the 1,400,000 number seems a reasonable approximation. 153. Ibid., p. 637 ("The government's policy in this case seeks to punish physicians on the basis of the content of doctor-patient communications. Only doctor-patient conversations that include discussions of the medical use of marijuana trigger the policy. Moreover, the policy . . . condemns expression of a particular viewpoint, i.e., that medical marijuana would likely help a specific patient. Such condemnation of particular views is especially troubling in the First Amendment context."). 183. Richard McAdams discusses the conditions under which norms actually trigger sanctions. He suggests there must be consensus as to whether some behavior is worthy of esteem, that any such consensus must be widely known, and that violations of the consensus (i.e., the norm) must be detectable. Richard H. On one view, a norm already exists and the law simply reflects the emerging norm. On the other view, the conditions for normative change are ripe, and the law stimulates the creation of the new norm. Which came first, the chicken or the egg? Without further, more-rigorous analyses, the verdict on the expressive effects of law must remain unproven. The ideas are interesting and the question is important, but, thus far, the observations are largely speculative. 192. In addition to broadcasting a more current and relevant signal concerning societal approval/ disapproval of medical use of marijuana, state laws arguably broadcast a clearer signal as well. The reason is that state laws are more focused than the CSA; they address only the medical use of marijuana, whereas the CSA addresses a host of topics, meaning the signal it broadcasts on any one of them (e.g., should medical marijuana be legal) will be quite noisy.
193. In the lingo of the norms literature, states can play the role of norm critics or norm entrepreneurs, facilitating changes to social norms; this role may be particularly important when criticizing extant norms is costly. Richard H. McAdams, "The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms," Michigan Law Review 96 (1997): 396 (discussing norm critics and how they often incur a cost when challenging conventional wisdom); Cass R. Sunstein, "Social Norms and Social Roles," Columbia Law Review 96 (1996): 929-30 (discussing role of norm entrepreneurs).
194. Indeed, jurors in the federal prosecution of Ed Rosenthal (the so-called ganja guru) claimed they would have acquitted him of marijuana charges had they known he was growing marijuana for medicinal purposes. The problem, of course, is that jurors may not know they are entitled to acquit the guilty, and courts may bar attorneys and witnesses from informing jurors of the nullification power. United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that trial court correctly excluded evidence of medical marijuana defense that could be used only to secure jury nullification).
